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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Elections Have Consequences: Moral Value Foundations Ensure 
Gridlock through the Ballot Box 
 
by 
Gregory John Regts 
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Clinical Psychology 
Loma Linda University, September 2015 
Dr. Hector Betancourt, Chairperson 
 
In the midst of unprecedented partisan polarization in the voting public and 
congressional gridlock in Washington, research in moral psychology has implicated 
reliance on differing moral value foundations between liberals and conservatives as a 
determinant of partisan divides. While Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) research has 
highlighted the effect of moral values on a variety of issues, little research has explained 
their effect on psychological factors and voting behavior related to fiscal concerns. 
Guided by Betancourt’s integrative model for studying culture, psychological factors, and 
behavior, the present study investigated the extent to which socially shared moral value 
foundations influence psychological reactions to a politician’s support for a 
compromising balanced fiscal policy, and related voting intentions among Democrats and 
Republicans. Five hundred twenty-three Democratic (n = 300) and Republican (n = 223) 
participants were recruited using convenience and snowball sampling. As proposed, 
participants who endorsed socially binding moral values (e.g. authority, purity, and in-
group loyalty) had stronger emotional and cognitive reactions to a politician’s support for 
a compromising balanced fiscal policy, which affected their intention to vote for that 
politician. This effect was indirect, through attribution-emotion processes, and moderated 
 xi 
by party affiliation, such that reactions were negative for Republicans and positive for 
Democrats. Results suggest that moral values may lead voters to elect politicians who are 
farther from the political center, perpetuating gridlock. 
  
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the wake of several controversies that riddled the Obama administration during 
the early part of 2013, a Republican congressperson from Oklahoma took to the floor of 
the House of Representatives to present a scathing rebuke against the President’s 
leadership ability. In his remarks, Representative Bridenstine stated that the President’s 
“dishonesty, incompetence, vengefulness and lack of moral compass lead many to 
suggest that he is not fit to lead” (Vamburkar, 2013; emphasis added). The comments 
themselves are not all too uncommon in the world of talk radio and cable news.  What 
was unique about these comments was the assumed appropriateness of making such an 
attack on a sitting President’s morality on the floor of the House of Representatives. In 
distinguishing right from wrong, the congressman was fortified in his belief that his right 
was objectively right, whereas the President’s right was objectively wrong, so much so 
that he was motivated to express his contempt on a public and generally civil stage.  
The contentiousness in this incident has become all too typical in America’s 
current political atmosphere, but is marked by an underlying conviction that those in the 
opposing party could not possibly hope for, or want, what is best for the country. As a 
result, recent polling suggests that Americans are more polarized along partisan lines on 
values and basic beliefs now than at any point in the past 25 years (Pew Research Center, 
2012). This divide was found to be greater than those based on gender, age, race, or class. 
Of greater concern, however, is the fact that this increase in partisanship has mostly 
occurred over the past 14 years, causing the two major political parties to become more 
ideologically homogeneous (Pew Research Center, 2014).  Specifically, it was found that 
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the largest partisan differences leading up to the 2012 elections were over the scope and 
role of government in the economic realm (Pew Research Center, 2012). 
 With the apparent hyper-partisanship in the voting public, it is no surprise that 
contentiousness and partisan divide have spilled over into the government itself. During 
the first half of the 111th congress (2009) there were a record 67 filibusters, double what 
occurred between 1950 and 1969 (U.S. Senate, 2013). By the end of the 111th congress’s 
two-years, there were 137 (U.S. Senate, 2013). An inability to work together, or to 
compromise, can have significant consequences on legislative effectiveness. Four 
hundred bills passed by the House of Representatives from 2009 through 2011 were 
never voted-on or even debated in the Senate due to an inability to obtain the required 60 
votes (U.S. Senate, 2013). By the fall of 2013, Congress’s inability to compromise 
ultimately led to an 18-day shutdown of the United States government (Ferraro & 
Younglai, 2013). 
The clear and halting gridlock that has resulted has been frustrating to voters and 
politicians alike. Although partisan polarization is not new, the current level of legislative 
ineffectiveness is unprecedented (Pew Research Center, 2014). In order to remedy this 
problem, however, we must first attempt to identify the source of the conflict. The 
purpose of this study was to investigate factors that may influence the escalating tension 
between Democrats and Republicans that has become all too apparent in Washington. 
Specifically, the present study examines the potential role of socially shared moral values 
and related psychological factors as they influence voter reactions to political 
compromise.  
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Moral Foundations Theory 
Recent research in political psychology has taken important strides towards 
understanding political tension. Haidt and his colleagues suggest that the basic conflict in 
partisanship is one based on moral values. Specifically, they have found that liberals and 
conservatives rely on a different set of moral foundations in determining what is right or 
wrong (Haidt, 2012). In this way, his Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) provides a more 
fundamental explanation for the unprecedented hyper-partisanship that we are seeing in 
our current political system, which provides a possible justification for why one politician 
might accuse another of “lacking a moral compass.”  
According to Haidt, varying moral foundations determine how the mind is 
organized to react in advance of experience (2012). In other words, he assumes that each 
person maintains an intuitive sense of right and wrong, and that this intuition initiates 
specific emotions (e.g. disgust, sympathy). One’s reactions to these intuitive emotions 
become the basis of moral judgments. Individuals subsequently create rationalizations for 
their evaluations (Sherman & Haidt, 2011). Haidt (2012; 2001) describes this process as 
an emotional (intuitive) dog, and its rational tail. In other words, intuition leads, and 
reason follows. Notably, this conceptualization stands in contrast to explanations 
provided by social-cognitive theories such as attribution theory, in which cognitive 
appraisals directly affect emotions (Weiner, 2006). In Haidt’s explanation, intuitive 
emotional reactions themselves influence our rational, or cognitive, appraisals.  
MFT suggests that varying sets of five moral foundations control each person’s 
intuitive dog. The first two (fairness/cheating, harm/care) are considered individualizing 
foundations (IF), as they are primarily concerned with protecting the rights of individual 
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people (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The fairness foundation, much in the way that 
Kohlberg described morality (1969), emphasizes the importance of fairness, reciprocity, 
and justice in moral judgments (Haidt & Graham, 2007). The harm foundation, which 
mirrors Gilligan’s descriptions of moral development (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987), is 
concerned with caring, nurturing, and protecting vulnerable individuals from harm (Haidt 
& Graham, 2007). These individualizing foundations have been identified and 
extensively studied in developmental psychology. However, MFT advances the argument 
by suggesting that moral values are not limited to values that protect individuals, but also 
include values that bind groups (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). 
The binding foundations (BF) (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, 
purity/sanctity) are hypothesized to have evolved as a way to preserve social institutions 
(Haidt, 2012). Haidt and Graham (2007) suggest that the loyalty foundation upholds 
virtues of loyalty and patriotism, and functions to celebrate sacrifice for the group, and 
punishment for traitors. The authority foundation helps to maintain respect for and 
obedience to tradition by supporting values of subordination and respect for authority, 
and the purity foundation encourages an ethic of purity that serves both hygienic and 
social functions by marking cultural boundaries and suppressing carnal selfishness.  
With respect to these foundations, researchers have consistently found that 
liberals rely on IF in their moral evaluations, whereas conservatives tend to utilize all five 
foundations to some extent, with BF consistently endorsed at higher levels (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011). As such, 
moral values do not necessarily indicate an objective right or wrong; rather, they are 
evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-
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interest, and to protect and promote certain social institutions (Haidt, 2012). From this 
perspective, it may very well be the case that a Democratic president does actually “lack” 
the moral compass that a Republican congressperson holds, while not actually lacking a 
moral compass. Even so, moral foundations alone cannot explain the current gridlock in 
congress entirely. If that were the case, the existing congressional ineffectiveness would 
be perpetual, rather than increasing. Perhaps the answer lies in how these moral 
foundations affect the most basic of democratic ideals. 
 
 
Voting Behavior 
How do voters decide which politicians stay in office, and which politicians 
leave? Voting behavior has long been an area of focus in American political science. 
Several theoretical models have been developed to help describe the motivators of voter 
choice (Antunes, 2010). Some models of voter choice primarily implicate partisanship 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960 as cited in Antunes, 2010), whereas others 
emphasize rational choice/self-interest (Downs, 1957 as cited in in Antunes, 2010) as 
essential for motivating political decision-making. These models, although disparate, help 
to map the domain of voting behavior, but only hold true for some voters in some 
contexts. One major criticism is the failure of existing models of voting behavior to 
acknowledge the variation across the voting public, and instead viewing the public as one 
group (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, & Prestion, 2010). Research in political 
psychology has identified other factors that have a great deal of influence on individual 
voter choice, and that lead people to vote against their party or even against their own 
self-interests.  
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Recent investigations into how and why people vote for particular issues or 
candidates reveals the complex, and sometimes inconsistent, effects of psychological 
processes on political opinions and behaviors. As an illustration of this complexity, 
research on the varying influence of emotional factors on voting, information seeking, 
and support for policy issues has found some competing results. For example, Miller 
(2011) found that political sophistication and engagement led to higher emotionality 
about political issues. Similarly, political engagement in the form of candidate 
evaluations were found to influence voter anxiety (Ladd & Lenz, 2008). On the other 
hand, voter fear and anxiety itself has also been found to cause voters to be less reliant on 
partisanship, and more likely to be more politically engaged by seeking out candidate 
information (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). Findings like these stimulate 
questions about the actual role of emotions in political behavior. Does emotionality lead 
to political engagement, or does political engagement lead to emotionality? Given results 
like these, it is at least clear that political behavior is not a purely emotional endeavor and 
that other factors must be involved. 
Research into cognitive processes related to political behaviors has helped to 
clarify some of these inconsistencies, highlighting the importance of the cognition-
emotion relationship for political behavior. One study found that, independent of political 
ideology, opinions about welfare were based on cognitive factors such as perceptions of 
the recipients’ effort, and that this effect was mediated by anger and compassion 
(Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2012). Further highlighting the complex role of 
cognition and emotion in political disposition, researchers have found that individuals 
differ in their need to engage in effortful thinking versus their need to seek out emotions 
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when evaluating political information, and that this difference implicates a different set of 
psychological predictors of political choices (i.e. cognitive evaluations versus affective 
attachments)(Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2013).  
Clearly, the factors that influence political behaviors are complex and variable, 
interfering with voters’ ability to vote consistently, or even “correctly.” In a study 
investigating the ability of voters to vote “correctly” for candidates who represent their 
own priorities, Lau (2012) found that primary voters performed barely better than chance, 
and were much worse than general election voters. Presumably, primary voters are, in 
fact, more partisan than general election voters. These findings highlight the fact that the 
act of voting, especially partisan voting, is often less rational than many would like to 
think. 
Given these discrepancies and the variable effects of emotion and cognition, some 
have suggested that there is something more fundamental, or innate, that determines how 
and why people vote. Lakoff (2004) suggests that voters tend to make political decisions 
by voting for their values, or their vision, for the country and its future. Related to general 
moral behaviors, some research has found that morality itself is more predictive of future 
deviant behavior in teenagers than other demographic factors (i.e., household income, 
parents’ education, social networks, and church attendance) (Vaisey, 2009). In this way, 
morality is implicated as a motivator of behavior, and suggests that even unarticulated 
moral schemas influence how people behave.  
Given MFT’s proposition that liberals and conservatives consistently vary in the 
moral values that they utilize (Haidt, 2012), the act of voting itself could be viewed 
simply as a means of voting for one’s moral vision for the future, separate from one’s 
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self-interest, but rather for the interest of the group. Recent research has provided some 
evidence for this, emphasizing the influence of moral value concerns and intention to 
vote. Johnson et al. (2014) found that IF foundations predicted voting intentions for 
liberals whereas BF predicted intentions for conservatives. As such, voting for or against 
specific candidates had a moral basis, and therefore could serve to indirectly push 
congressional representatives ideologically farther apart by way of the ballot box. In 
other words, the binding function of moral values could cause the need to maintain group 
cohesion to dominate the functionality of the institution. This may be highlighted by 
research that suggests that the importance of one’s political group identity is even more 
present in the aftermath of an election. Motyl (2014) found that, following the 2012 
election, Romney voters were more likely to endorse desire to migrate out of the country 
due to a reduced sense of belonging to the U.S. If moral values are at the basis of these 
political intentions and behaviors, serving to bind, strengthen, and increase our sense of 
belonging to communities, while dissuading or punishing moral violators (Haidt, 2012), 
then voting itself is a moral behavior.  
In a broad sense, research suggests that moral value foundations have a 
substantial impact on various aspects of one’s psychological make-up. Niemi and Young 
(2013) found links between moral value foundations and various interpersonal 
orientations such that individuals who were oriented towards controlling and status-
seeking behaviors were more likely to endorse authority values and less likely to endorse 
caring values, whereas higher caring valuations were associated with more prosocial 
orientations. Similarly, individualizing moral foundations specifically have been found to 
be negatively associated with levels of spitefulness (Zeigler-Hill, Noser, Roof, Vonk, & 
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Marcus, 2015). Research goes as far as highlighting associations between moral value 
foundations and pathological personality features such as negative affect and antagonism 
(Noser, Siegler-Hill, Vrabel, Besser, Ewing, & Southard, 2015). Additionally, evidence 
suggests that differing moral emphases do influence voter decisions. Not surprisingly, 
moral value foundations have been found to influence attitudes on culture war issues 
(e.g., the effect of sanctity on same-sex marriage, abortion, and cloning), and that this 
effect accounts for significantly more variance than more general value constructs 
(Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). Moreover, moral value foundations have 
been found to influence the degree of political polarization on environmental attitudes, 
even indicating that conservatives’ attitudes about the environment can be improved by 
couching environmental issues in more conservatively endorsed BF (Feinberg & Willer, 
2012). Moral value foundations have also been found to be influential in explaining 
foreign policy attitudes, as IF predict preference for cooperative internationalism and BF 
predict militant internationalism (Kertzer, Powers, Rathbun, & Iyer, 2014). Overall, the 
literature suggests that moral values foundations affect one’s psychology generally (i.e., 
cognitions, emotions), and, therefore, are important in both dictating ideological 
concerns, and influencing moral behavior in general social contexts (Carnes, Lickel, & 
Jonoff-Bulman, 2015).  
Research on differences in the mechanisms of political decision-making between 
liberals and conservatives implicates the unique link between morality, emotion, and 
cognition. Regarding the administration of personal aid, for example, liberals were found 
to feel morally wrong using personal responsibility as a criterion for withholding aid 
while conservatives did not (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). However, liberals may actually 
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have initial responses to issues that more closely resemble conservative reactions, but 
tend to re-think and correct these responses (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & 
Champerlin, 2002), indicating more active cognitive mechanisms. Similarly, others have 
found that by reducing cognitive faculty through fatigue, distraction, and higher cognitive 
load, liberals tended to act more like conservatives in their decision-making (Eidelman, 
Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012). These findings suggest that there are cognitive 
mechanisms for liberal decision-making that may function differently than the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in conservative decision-making.  
Research on MFT provides strong evidence that moral values, at least in part, 
have substantial influence in determining our political reactions and ideologies, but has 
not investigated the impact of moral values on the psychological factors central in 
political decision-making. For MFT to more completely describe the underlying 
mechanisms that determine partisanship and the scope of voting behavior, evidence must 
show that the hypothesized moral values also effect subsequent intuitive reactions and 
cognitive evaluations. To date, there has been little research on whether specific cognitive 
mechanisms are motivated by these underlying value foundations. 
 
 
The Present Study 
The existing literature makes it clear that voter decision-making is a complex and 
interactional process, and much of the research on moral value foundations and voter 
attitudes is limited to its effect on social, non-fiscal, issues. At the basis of MFT, 
however, is the assumption that there are innate moral value structures that serve to bind 
individuals into conservative or liberal factions. If this is the case, and if voting is in fact 
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a moral behavior, then the act itself may function to maintain group cohesion by 
punishing those perceived to be moral violators, even on economic rather than social 
policy. Over time, and with the certain environmental factors (e.g., media), this may lead 
individuals to vote to the extremes and away from compromise, further polarizing the 
government. In the current study we intend to further elucidate these effects by 
investigating the following questions: Do moral foundations determine voting behavior 
related to economic issues? What is the role of cognition in determining voting behavior 
based on moral foundations? Do we tend to punish elected officials who offend our moral 
foundations? 
In order to test research questions that involve complex interrelations of multiple 
variables, strong theoretical guidance is necessary. Unfortunately, existing models of 
voter behavior do not necessarily include hypotheses that integrate cultural influences 
(e.g., socially shared moral values) and psychological factors. In order to account for the 
influence of moral values and psychological factors, the current study will utilize an 
integrative theoretical model designed to study the structure of relationships among social 
structural, cultural, and psychological factors, as they relate to behavior (Betancourt, 
Hardin, & Manzi, 1992; Betancourt & Lopez, 1993), that has previously been adapted to 
investigate the role of culture in determining health behaviors (Betancourt & Flynn, 
2009; Betancourt, Flynn, Riggs, & Garberoglio, 2010). For this study, Betancourt’s 
integrative model was applied to voting behavior in order to examine the hypothesized 
structure of relationships (see Figure 1). Expectations based on this theoretical model 
recognize the direct and/or indirect influence of a person’s own cultural beliefs, values, 
norms, and expectations on a particular behavior, as well as the proximal influence of 
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psychological processes. 
The aim of the present study is to investigate the extent to which moral value 
foundations influence voters’ reactions to acts of political compromise by their 
representatives. This aim was tested through the following specific hypotheses. First, 
consistent with the theoretical model guiding this study, it was hypothesized that the 
effect of population factors would have an indirect, rather than direct, influence on voter 
choice through moral values and psychological factors (e.g., intuitive emotional 
reactions, attributions for compromise). Second, it was hypothesized that moral values 
would influence participants’ voting behavior directly and/or indirectly through the 
psychological factors noted above. Third, it was hypothesized that the strength of these 
effects would be moderated by party affiliation (i.e., Democrat, Republican).  
 
 
Figure 1. Betancourt’s integrative model of culture, psychological processes, and 
behavior adapted for the study of voting behavior. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODS 
 
Participants and Procedures 
Data were collected as part of a larger effort to study the cultural and 
psychological antecedents of voter decision-making. Following approval from Loma 
Linda University’s Institutional Review Board, recruitment was conducted using internet-
based convenience and snowball sampling. Participants were recruited from online social 
media sources between January 2014 and May 2014. Participants were eligible for 
inclusion if they were (a) over the age of 18, (b) eligible to vote in the U.S., (c) able to 
access the internet in order to complete the online survey, and (d) able to read and 
respond to an English language survey.  
After being contacted online via social networks and email listservs, participants 
were directed to a website where they were given the opportunity to complete the online 
survey, which utilized Qualtrics Software. Once they arrived at the website, potential 
participants were presented with a written summary of the objectives of the study, the 
risks and benefits of participation, and electronically acknowledged consent to participate 
in the study or decline without penalty. Participants were then required to confirm that 
they met the eligibility criteria summarized above before being directed to complete the 
survey. After accessing the instrument, participants were first asked to respond to several 
items regarding demographic variables, followed by items related to moral values, and 
concluding with the measure of political compromise described below. Throughout 
completion of the survey, participants were required to answer each item on a page 
before being directed to the subsequent page. Participants who completed the survey  
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Table 1. Sample demographics by Political Party Affiliation 
Variable 
Study Sample Not Retained 
Republican 
(n = 223) 
Democrat 
(n = 300) 
Republican 
(n = 7) 
Democrat            
(n = 15) 
 
M (SD) M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
Age in years b  41.89 (16.10) 35.00 (14.09) 29.86 (14.59) 33.73 (11.65) 
Education  16.44 (2.50) 16.67 (2.76) 14.71 (3.2) 17.27 (3.47) 
Likelihood of Voting in 
     Next Election 
7.16 (1.78) 7.16 (1.68) 6.0 (2.08) 7.10 (1.22) 
 n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Gender a     
     Male 88 (39.5) 111 (37.0) 3 (42.9) 8 (53.3) 
     Female 135 (60.5) 189 (63.0) 4 (57.1) 6 (40.0) 
     Other - - 0 (0.0) 1 (6.7) 
Income b     
    ≤ $14,999 15 (6.7) 22 (7.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
    $15-24,999 7 (3.1) 22 (7.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (6.7) 
    $25-39,999 17 (7.6) 41 (13.7) 0 (0.0) 4 (26.7) 
    $40-59,999 35 (15.7) 46 (15.3) 3 (42.9) 4 (26.7) 
    $60-79,999 30 (13.5) 49 (16.3) 1 (14.3) 1 (6.7) 
    $80-99,999  32 (14.3) 39 (13.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (6.7) 
    $100-149,999 41 (18.4) 51 (17.0) 3 (42.9) 3 (20.0) 
    > 150,000 46 (20.6) 30 (10.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (6.7) 
Marital Status b     
    Single 59 (26.5) 112 (37.3) 5 (71.4) 6 (40.0) 
    Married 139 (62.3) 129 (43.0) 2 (28.6) 5 (33.3) 
    Cohabitating 3 (1.3) 32 (10.7) 0 (0.0) 2 (13.3) 
    Divorced 9 (4.0) 14 (4.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
    Separated 2 (0.9) 2 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
    Widowed 4 (1.8) 2 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
    Never Married 7 (3.1) 9 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (13.3) 
Race/Ethnicity c     
    Anglo 161 (72.2) 205 (68.3) 3 (42.9) 12 (80.0) 
    Hispanic/Latino 15 (6.7) 41 (13.7) 1 (14.3) 1 (6.7) 
    African America  4 (1.8) 9 (3.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
    Asian American/PI 13 (5.8) 13 (4.3) 0 (0.0) 2 (13.3) 
     Native American 2 (0.9) 1 (0.3) 0 (0.0 0 (0.0) 
    Other 28 (12.6) 31 (10.3) 3 (42.9) 0 (0.0) 
 a significant differences/associations between/across Democrats. 
 b significant differences/associations within ‘Study Sample’.  
 c significant differences/associations within ‘Not Retained’. 
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were given an opportunity to enter a random drawing for a chance to receive one of ten 
$50 Amazon.com gift cards. 
Utilizing these procedures, a total of 607 participants were recruited over a three-
month period. Of those, 17 were excluded based on evaluation of adequate time to 
complete survey accurately (> 15 min), and eight were excluded due to their responses on 
poor effort screening items (n = 25; 7 Republican, 15 Democrat, 3 Other). Of the 582 
remaining participants, 300 (51.5%) identified as Democrat/Democrat-leaning 
Independents, 223 (38.3%) identified as Republican/Republican-leaning Independents, 
and 59 (10.1%) identified as Libertarian or “Other.” The resulting proportions were 
remarkably similar to observed party affiliation in the U.S. [Democrat/Democrat-leaning 
(47%), Republican/Republican-leaning (41%), Other (12%); Gallup, 2013]. Because the 
study aims were intended to focus on response patterns based on party affiliation between 
the two major U.S. political parties, only Democrat/Democrat-leaning Independents (n = 
300) and Republican/Republican-leaning Independents (n = 223) were examined. 
Demographic information and comparisons between retained and not retained 
participants are presented in Table 1 and described below. Throughout the rest of this 
paper, these combined groups will be referred to by their major party affiliation 
(Democrat, Republican). 
 
 
Measures 
Population Factors/Demographics 
Population factors and demographic variables were self-reported by participants 
including age (in years), gender, income, education (in years), race/ethnicity, marital 
status, political party affiliation, and partisanship. Income was measured based on eight 
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ordinal categories, and was treated as continuous in study analyses. Partisanship was 
determined based on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly liberal) to 7 (strongly 
conservative) with moderate at the midpoint.  
The method has been used with great utility in past research in political and moral 
psychology (Graham, Haidt, Nosek, 2009; Jost, 2006).  
Moral Values. Moral values were measured using the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham, Haidt, Nosek, 2009). The MFQ included two parts. The 
first part included 16 items with the question stem, “When you decide whether something 
is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your 
thinking?” Participants rated their responses on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at the 
extremes from 1 (not at all relevant) to 6 (extremely relevant). Following are examples of 
items that relate to each of the five moral foundations: “Whether or not someone suffered 
emotionally” (Harm/Care), “Whether or not some people were treated differently than 
others” (Fairness/Reciprocity), “Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or 
her country” (In-group/Loyalty), “Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for 
authority” (Authority/Respect), and “Whether or not someone violated standards of 
purity and decency” (Purity/Sanctity).  
The second part of the MFQ also included 16 items. However, participants were 
asked to “Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or 
disagreement.” Responses were rated on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at the extremes 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Following are examples of items that 
relate to each of the five moral foundations: “Compassion for those who are suffering is 
the most crucial virtue” (Harm/Care),  “When the government makes laws, the number 
 17 
one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly” (Fairness/Reciprocity), “I 
am proud of my country’s history” (In-group/Loyalty), “Respect for authority is 
something all children need to learn” (Authority/Respect), and “People should not do 
things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed” (Purity/Sanctity). Scores for the 
MFQ range from 0-30 for each of the five foundations, which are composed of 6 items.  
The Cronbach’s alphas for each 6-item Moral Foundation scale demonstrated 
good to poor reliability:  Harm/Care (αREP = .54; αDEM = .51; αOverall = .54), 
Fairness/Reciprocity (αREP = .70; αDEM = .57; αOverall = .66), In-group/Loyalty (αREP = .65; 
αDEM = .68; αOverall = .67), Authority/Respect (αREP = .57; αDEM = .69; αOverall = .69), and 
Purity/Sanctity (αREP = .76; αDEM = .78; αOverall = .82). Although some of the Cronbach’s 
alphas were lower than what is generally considered acceptable in social science 
research, the observed values were consistent with previously published research using 
these constructs: Harm/Care (α = .62), Fairness/Reciprocity (α = .67), Ingroup/Loyalty (α 
= .59), Authority/Respect (α = .39), and Purity/Sanctity (α = .70) (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009).  
Similar to more recent research utilizing these scales (Napier & Luguri, 2013; 
Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014), this study delineated IF and BF (IF [α = .80] 
and BF [α = .81]; IF [α = .86] and BF [α = .85]), finding similarly good reliability among 
political parties (IF (12 items): αREP = .77, αDEM= .70, αOverall = .75; BF (18 items): αREP 
= .81, αDEM = .86, αOverall= .87).  
Psychological Factors Related to Political Compromise. The Political 
Compromise Scale was developed in order to measure emotions and cognitions related to 
perceptions of political compromise regarding the government’s role in economic policy 
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(e.g., size and scope of government), as this was found to be the largest partisan 
difference leading up to the 2012 elections (Pew Research Center, 2012). Participants 
were asked to respond to a vignette indicating that a congressperson from their own 
district and political party voted for a bill that helped to balance the federal budget by 
increasing taxes on wealthy Americans and cutting spending for social assistance 
programs. Following the vignette, participants were asked, “How does this make you feel 
about your congressperson?” and rated their responses on a 7-point Likert scale anchored 
at the extremes from 1 (Very Displeased) to 7 (Very Pleased), measuring their intuitive 
emotional reactions to the behavior. Next, attributions for compromising behavior were 
assessed as participants were asked to indicate why they thought their congressperson 
voted this way on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at the extremes from 1 (Entirely for 
personal gain) to 6 (Entirely for the good of the country). Finally, participants were 
asked, “Based on this vote, how likely would you be to vote to reelect this person in an 
upcoming election?” which was also rated on a 6-point Likert scale.  
 
 
Statistical Analyses 
Several statistical procedures were utilized to address study aims and hypotheses. 
Descriptive statistics, evaluations for univariate and multivariate normality, psychometric 
evaluations, partitioning of covariates, independent samples t-tests, and bivariate 
correlation analyses were conducted using SPSS 22.0. In order to test the hypothesized 
structure of relationships while accounting for the influence of other study variables, 
Bentler’s structural equation modeling (SEM) program was used (EQS 6.1; 2005) with 
the maximum likelihood method of estimation. The influence of covariates (i.e., age, 
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education, income, and gender) were partitioned from the covariance matrix prior to SEM 
in order to maintain a simplified model without using up model degrees of freedom (see 
Kammeyer-Mueller & Wanberg, 2003). Adequacy of model fit was assessed using a non-
significant χ² goodness-of-fit statistic, a df/χ² ratio of less than 2.0 (Tabachnick et al., 
2001), a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .95 or greater, a Standardized Root Mean Square 
Residual (SRMR) of less than .08, and a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) of less than .05 and upper-bound CI < .10 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). 
Modifications to the hypothesized model were employed based on results from the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for adding parameters, the Wald test for removing model 
parameters, in addition to theoretical considerations.  
In order to test moderating hypotheses, multi-group tests of invariance were also 
conducted according to procedures outlined by Byrne (1995). The test of invariance was 
performed in multiple steps following the establishment of fit of baseline models for 
Democratic and Republican participants. First, separate baseline models were tested 
without constraints across parties, serving as the reference model, in order to establish 
configural invariance, which would suggest that the same items are indicators of the same 
factors for both parties. Second, factor loadings were constrained to be equal across 
parties, where a non-significant change in fit indicates measurement equivalence between 
groups. Therefore, if differences in structural paths occurred, they could be assumed to be 
due to actual differences between groups rather than measurement artifacts (van de Vijver 
& Leung, 1997). In the final step, all structural paths were constrained to be equal across 
parties. If decrement in fit was indicated by the LM Test of equality constraints and it 
was determined that releasing equality constraints drastically improved model fit, based 
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on LM χ²  5.0 per df, then paths were considered non-invariant and released 
sequentially. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
A comparison between the removed Republican and Democrat cases and those 
retained (see Table 1) revealed no significant differences between groups in age, t(543) = 
1.64, p > .05, d = .36; years of education, t(543) = 0.20, p > .05, d = .04; household 
income, t(543) = 0.42, p > .05, d = .09; partisanship, t(543) = 0.90, p > .05, d = .20; or 
likelihood of voting in the next election, t(543) = 1.17, p > .05, d = .25. Similarly, no 
significant associations were found between those removed and retained on 
race/ethnicity, χ2 (5) = 1.54, p > .05, ϕc = .05; or marital status, χ2 (6) = 7.36, p > .05, ϕc = 
.12. However, there was a significant association for gender in that those removed were 
more likely to be male (50%) than those retained (38%), χ2 (2) = 25.49, p < .001, ϕ = .22.  
Moreover, comparisons between removed and retained participants for 
Republicans indicated no significant differences in age, t(228) = 1.95, p = .052, d = .74; 
years of education, t(228) = 1.79, p > .05, d = .69; household income, t(228) = 0.04, p > 
.05, d = .02; partisanship, t(228) = 0.62, p > .05, d = .24; or likelihood of voting in the 
next election, t(228) = 1.70, p > .05, d = .65; and no significant associations were found 
between those removed and retained on gender, χ2 (1) = .03, p > .05, ϕ = .01; 
race/ethnicity, χ2 (5) = 6.60, p > .05, ϕc = .17; or marital status, χ2 (6) = 6.98, p > .05, ϕc = 
.17. Similarly, comparisons between removed and retained participants for Democrats 
indicated no significant differences in age, t(313) = 0.34, p > .05, d = .09; years of 
education, t(313) = 0.81, p > .05, d = .21; household income, t(313) = 0.30, p > .05, d = 
.08; partisanship, t(313) = 0.21, p > .05, d = .06; or likelihood of voting in the next 
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election, t(313) = 0.22, p > .05, d = .06; and no significant associations were found 
between those removed and retained on race/ethnicity, χ2 (5) = 5.29, p > .05, ϕc = .13; or 
marital status, χ2 (6) = 5.70, p > .05, ϕc =.13. However, there was a significant association 
for gender in that those removed were more likely to be male (53%) than those retained 
(37%), χ2 (2) = 22.23, p < .001, ϕ = .27. 
Within the study sample, Republican participants (M = 41.89, SD = 16.10) were 
older than Democratic participants (M = 35.00, SD = 14.09), t(521) = 5.20, p < .001, , d = 
.46; and had significantly higher income (M = 5.46, SD = 2.09) than Democratic 
participants (M = 2.06, SD = 2.06), t(521) = 3.43, p = .001, d =  .30 (see Table 1). An 
association was found between party affiliation and marital status such that Democratic 
participants were more likely to be single (37.3%) or cohabitating (10.7%) and less likely 
to be married (43.0%) than Republican participants (26.5%, 1.3%, and 62.3% 
respectively), χ2 (6) = 32.19, p < .001, ϕc = .25. No significant associations or differences 
between party affiliation and race/ethnicity, gender, or education were found. 
Additionally, the majority of participants within each party were female (60.5% 
Republican; 63.0% Democrat) and Anglo-American (72.2% Republican; 68.3% 
Democrat) with greater than 16 years of education (Republican: M = 16.44, SD = 2.50; 
Democrat: M = 16.67, SD = 2.76). 
Prior to hypothesis testing, the variance explained by relevant covariates (i.e., age, 
gender, education, and income) was partitioned from the study variables in order to 
maintain a simplified model without using up model degrees of freedoms (see 
Kammeyer-Mueller & Wanberg, 2003). Correlations of covariates with study variables, 
and means and standard deviations of covariates are displayed in Table 2.   
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Table 2. Intercorrelations with covariates, means, and standard deviations as a function of 
Party  
      Variable Age Gender Education Income 
1. Partisanship 
 
.202** 
(.026) 
.001 
(-.067) 
.023 
(-.095) 
.051 
(-.049) 
2. Harm/Care 
 
-.027 
(.116*) 
.318*** 
(.227***) 
-.162* 
(.098) 
-.098 
(.010) 
3. Fairness/Reciprocity 
 
-.038 
(.011) 
-.162* 
(.090) 
-.141* 
(.104) 
-.097 
(-.049) 
4. Ingroup/Loyalty 
 
.124 
(.039) 
.006 
(-.084) 
-.137* 
(-.104) 
.012 
(-.013) 
5. Authority/Respect 
 
.279*** 
(.106) 
.089 
(-.059) 
-.094 
(-.066) 
.111 
(-.015) 
6. Purity/Sanctity 
 
.274*** 
(.120*) 
.062 
(.024) 
-.133* 
(-.070) 
.040 
(-.034) 
7.    Intuitive Reaction 
 
-.062 
(-.013) 
-.053 
(-.094) 
.102 
(.000) 
.063 
(.004) 
8.    Attribution for Compromise 
        
.057 
(.060) 
.022 
(-.079) 
.125 
(.071) 
.037 
(.030) 
9.    Vote for Compromise 
 
-.053 
(.051) 
-.072 
(-.063) 
.120 
(.078) 
.065 
(.049) 
M 41.89 
(35.00) 
- 16.44 
(16.67) 
5.46 
(4.83) 
SD 16.10 
(14.09) 
- 2.50 
(2.76) 
2.09 
(2.06) 
Note. Intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations for Republican participants (n = 223) are presented in upper portion 
of cell, and values in parentheses represent Democratic participants (n = 300). Boldface indicates that groups differ 
significantly at p < .05. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Prior to conducting a test of the structural model for Democrat and Republican 
samples, data were screened for multivariate outliers. Following these analyses, one 
Republican and two Democratic participants were removed from further analysis.  
Additional tests of multivariate normality revealed no violations; therefore, standard test 
statistics were used to evaluate model fit. Means and standard deviations of study 
variables following the removal of multivariate outliers and partitioning of covariates are 
displayed in Table 3. As expected, Republicans were found to be significantly more 
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conservative than Democrats, t(518) = 29.14, p < .001, d = 2.58. Similarly, as expected 
based on Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2009), Democrats scored 
significantly higher than Republicans on Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity, t(518) = 
4.36, p < .001, d = .39; as well as on Fairness/Reciprocity, t(518) = 7.74, p < .001, d = 
.69. Republicans scored significantly higher than Democrats on Ingroup/Loyalty, 
Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity (t[518] = 5.84, p < .001, d = .52; t[516.95] = 
10.96, p < .001, d = .97; t[502.62] = 13.50, p < .001, d = 1.20), respectively.  
Table 3 also displays the correlations among study variables after partitioning of 
the covariates noted above. Fisher’s r-to-z test of difference revealed several significantly 
different correlations based on political party. Specifically, significantly stronger positive 
correlations were found for Democrats between partisanship and Ingroup/Loyalty as well 
as between partisanship and Authority/Respect, such that increased levels of 
conservatism were associated with higher levels of endorsement of these value 
foundations for Democrats compared to Republicans (z = 3.09, p < .01; z = 2.06, p < .05), 
respectively. Similarly, greater endorsement of the Purity/Sanctity foundation was found 
to be associated with significantly higher levels of endorsement of the Ingroup/Loyalty 
and Authority/Respect foundations for Democrats compared to Republicans (z = 3.55, p 
< .001; z = 2.70, p < .01), respectively. On the other hand, increased endorsement of the 
Harm/Care foundation was related to higher levels of endorsement of the 
Ingroup/Loyalty and Authority/Respect foundations, and higher endorsement of the 
Fairness/Reciprocity foundation was related to greater endorsement of the 
Ingroup/Loyalty foundation for Republicans compared to Democrats (z = 2.27, p < .05; z 
= 2.41, p < .01; z = 2.03, p < .05), respectively
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Table 3. Intercorrelations  with means, and standard deviations of study variables as a function of Political Party after 
partitioning covariates 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Partisanship 
 __         
2. Harm/Care 
 -.126 
(-.085) 
__        
3. Fairness/Reciprocity 
 -.169* 
(-.167**) 
.613*** 
(.528***) 
__       
4.    Ingroup/Loyalty 
 .057 
(.321***) 
.379*** 
(.194**) 
.347*** 
(.179**) 
__      
5.    Authority/Respect 
 .261*** 
(.423***) 
.274*** 
(.066) 
.296*** 
(.143*) 
.562*** 
(.623***) 
. __     
6.    Purity/Sanctity 
 .374*** 
(.464***) 
.287* 
(.199**) 
.076 
(.086) 
.241*** 
(.510***) 
.425*** 
(.601***) 
__    
7.    Intuitive Reaction 
 -.155* 
(.116*) 
-.050 
(-.031) 
.017 
(-.054) 
-.203** 
(.131*) 
-.153* 
(.100) 
-.154* 
(.017) 
__   
8.    Attributions for 
       Compromise 
 
 -.077 
(.074) 
.016 
(-.014) 
.022 
(.031) 
-.117 
(.111) 
-.071 
(.063) 
-.072 
(-.011) 
.506*** 
(.332***) 
__  
9.    Vote for  
       Compromise 
 
 -.147* 
(.067) 
-.028 
(-.075) 
.061 
(-.101) 
-.172* 
(.078) 
-.125 
(.026) 
-.153* 
(-.010) 
.807*** 
(.755***) 
.629*** 
(.501***) 
__ 
M  
5.24 
(2.60) 
4.33 
(4.57) 
4.20 
(4.64) 
3.80 
(3.40) 
4.30 
(3.64) 
4.20 
(3.05) 
3.86 
(3.63) 
3.78 
(3.77) 
3.99 
(4.03) 
SD  1.01 
(1.03) 
0.67 
(0.61) 
0.69 
(0.59) 
0.76 
(0.79) 
0.60 
(0.78) 
0.90 
(1.02) 
1.57 
(1.47) 
1.18 
(1.11) 
1.74 
(1.49) 
Note. Intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations for Republican participants (n = 222) are presented in upper portion of cell, and values in 
parentheses represent Democrat participants (n = 298). Boldface indicates that groups differ significantly at p < .05. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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These analyses also indicated significant differences in directionality such that 
increased levels of conservatism were found to be related to more negative intuitive 
reactions to an act of political compromise for Republicans, but more positive reactions 
for Democrats (z = -3.06, p < .01), with similar difference in directionality noted in the 
correlations between partisanship and an affirmative vote (z = -2.41, p < .01). Similarly, 
increased endorsement of Ingroup/Loyalty was associated with negative intuitive 
reactions, attributing politician’s vote to efforts at personal gain, and voting against that 
politician for Republicans, but positive relationships between these variables for 
Democrats (z = -3.79, p < .001; z = -2.57, p < .01; z = -2.82, p < .01), respectively, and 
increased endorsement of Authority/Respect was associated with negative intuitive 
reactions for Republicans, and positive reactions for Democrats (z = -2.85, p < .01). 
Finally, the positive association between intuitive reactions and attributions for 
compromise as well as the association between attributions for compromise and one’s 
subsequent voting choice were found to be significantly stronger for Republicans 
compared to Democrats (z = 2.38, p < .01; z = 2.12, p < .05), respectively. Given these 
significant between-group differences, the need to conduct a test of invariance was 
further confirmed.  
 
 
Structural Equation Modeling 
Test of the Hypothesized Model 
The hypothesized model for Democrats (CFI = .98, χ2 (18, n =298) = 34.44, p = 
.01, χ2/df = 1.91, SRMR=.035, RMSEA = .055, 90% CI (.026, .083) demonstrated good 
fit to the data aside from significant χ2 (Figure 2). However, the hypothesized model for 
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Republicans (CFI = .96, χ2 (18, n =222) = 42.54, p = .001, χ2/df = 2.36, SRMR=.044, 
RMSEA =.079, 90% CI (.048, .11)) demonstrated poor fit due to significant χ2, χ2/df  > 
2.0, and upper bound RMSEA CI > .10. Due to the above noted detriment in fit, re-
specification and modifications of the models based on theoretical and statistical 
considerations was indicated.  
 
 
Modified model 
Based on theoretical and statistical considerations, the hypothesized model was 
modified. Specifically, in a sequential manner, a direct path was added from Harm/Care 
to Purity/Sanctity, and estimates were removed from IF to attribution for compromise and 
voter choice, and from BF to attribution of motivation and voter choice (see Figure 3). 
The resulting model for Democrats (CFI = .99, χ2 (21, n =298) = 31.30, p = .07, χ2/df = 
1.49, SRMR=.035, RMSEA = .041, 90% CI (.000, .069)) demonstrated excellent fit, and 
the Republican model (CFI = .98, χ2 (21, n =222) = 34.14, p = .04, χ2/df = 1.63, 
SRMR=.045, RMSEA =.053, 90% CI (.014, .084)) demonstrated good fit as the χ2 
statistic was improved, but continued to be significant. The resulting models explained 
64% of the variance in voter choice for Democratic participants (R2 = .64), and 72% of 
the variance in voter choice for Republican participants (R2 = .72). In addition, some 
differences in magnitude and significance of the associations between factors were 
observed, again indicating the need for comparison, and were further examined through 
multiple group analyses (Figure 3).
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.05 (-.07)  
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.25**  (.48***)  
-.1
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  (
-.1
8*
)  
.78 (.61)  
Republican: CFI = .96, χ2 (18, n =222) = 42.54, p = .001, χ2/df = 2.36, SRMR=.044, RMSEA =.079, 90% CI (.048, .11) 
Democrat: CFI = .98, χ2 (18, n =298) = 34.44, p = .01, χ2/df = 1.91, SRMR=.035, RMSEA = .055, 90% CI (.026, .083) 
*p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Figure 2. Hypothesized model of moral values, intuitive reactions, and attributions for compromise for Democrats and Republicans. 
Values in parentheses represent Democratic participants; Harm/Care and Ingroup/Loyalty were used to set metric for latent variables; 
Correlations between latent variables were specified as correlations between disturbances. 
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Test of Configural Invariance (Model 1) 
In order to test measurement equivalence, configural invariance first needed to be 
established. The factor structure of the baseline model was tested without constraints in 
order to establish equality across political groups. The requirement for configural 
invariance suggests that the same items must be indicators of the same factor for 
Republicans and Democrats, permitting differences in factor loadings across groups 
(Byrne, 2006). The fit indices revealed a good fit to the data, and therefore configural 
invariance was upheld (CFI = .99, χ2 (42, n =520) = 65.44, p = .01, χ2/df = 1.56, SRMR= 
.040, RMSEA = .046, 90% CI (.022, .067)). Although χ2 statistic continued to be 
significant, the χ2/df ratio was well below 2.0, and other fit indices indicated excellent fit. 
 
 
Test of Measurement Invariance (Model 2) 
Measurement equivalence was tested by constraining the factor loadings of the 
revised model to be equal across groups, which made them invariant between 
Republicans and Democrats. The fit of the constrained measurement model was also 
good (CFI = .98, χ2 (45, n =520) = 74.45, p < .004, χ2/df = 1.65, SRMR= .047, RMSEA = 
.050, 90% CI (.029, .070)). A significant decrement in model fit was not indicated, as the 
LM test of equality constraints statistics indicated no significant between-group 
differences in the paths of the measurement model of LM χ²  5.0 per df, confirming that 
the measurement model operated similarly for both Republicans and Democrats. As such, 
any observed group variations in the multi-group model could be interpreted as group 
differences rather than the result of measurement artifacts (Chen, 2008).  
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Figure 3. Modified model of moral values, intuitive reactions, and attributions for compromise for Democrats and Republicans. 
Values in parentheses represent Democratic participants; Harm/Care and Ingroup Loyalty were used to set metric for latent variables; 
Correlations between latent variable was specified as correlation of disturbances.
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Test of Structural Invariance (Model 3, 4, 5, 6) 
In order to test for differences in the magnitude of paths among the study 
variables across political party, constraints were imposed on all structural paths. In the 
first iteration of this process, a decrement in fit was observed in the constrained model 
compared to the configural model (CFI = .97, χ2 (55, n =520) = 108.54, p < .001, χ2/df = 
1.97, SRMR=.088, RMSEA = .061, 90% CI (.044, .078)), indicated by the LM test for 
equality of constraints, which suggested that the constraint on the path from BF to 
Intuitive Reaction should be released (LM χ² = 9.74, p = .002). This confirmed that the 
effect of BF on Intuitive Reaction differed as a function of political party. After releasing 
this path, the fit improved slightly (CFI = .97, χ2 (54, n =520) = 97.93, p < .001, χ2/df = 
1.81, SRMR=.074, RMSEA = .056, 90% CI (.038, .073)). However, the LM test 
indicated additional improvement of fit with the release of the constraint on the path from 
Partisanship to BF (LM χ² = 9.51, p = .002). The resulting multi-group comparison 
demonstrated good fit to the data (CFI = .98, χ2 (53, n =520) = 88.28, p = .002, χ2/df = 
1.67, SRMR= .065, RMSEA = .051, 90% CI (.031, .069)), and the LM test did not 
suggest additional improvement of fit of LM χ²  5.0 per df with the release of additional 
constraints. 
 
 
Test of Research Hypotheses 
The proposed structure of the model in which the influence of moral values on 
voter choice would act both directly and/or indirectly through psychological factors (e.g., 
intuitive reaction, and attributions for compromise) demonstrated good fit for Democrats, 
but poor fit for Republicans. Modifications to the model resulted in significant 
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improvement in fit for both groups. The first hypothesis that the effect of population 
factors would have an indirect, rather than direct, influence on voter choice through 
moral values and psychological factors was upheld. Partisanship was found to have a 
significant indirect effect on voter choice for Republicans and Democrats such that higher 
levels of conservatism had a negative indirect effect on voter choice for Republicans, β 
indirect = -.09, p = .01, whereas higher levels of conservatism had a positive indirect effect 
on voter choice for Democrats, β indirect = .06, p = .03. 
The second hypothesis, that moral values would influence participant’s voting 
behavior directly and/or indirectly through psychological factors was upheld for BF, but 
not for IF. Significant indirect effects from BF to voter choice were found for 
Republicans, β indirect = -.25, p = .002, and Democrats, β indirect = .10, p = .04, but not from 
IF to voter choice (Republican: β indirect = .12, p = .12; Democrat: β indirect = -.065, p = .17). 
Additionally, although direct effects from moral values to voter choice were specified in 
the hypothesized model, they were found to be non-significant (IF (Republicans: β = .05 
p > .05; Democrats: β = -.07 p > .05); BF (Republicans: β = -.04 p > .05; Democrats: β = 
-.04 p > .05)), and the Wald test for removing parameters suggested removing those paths 
from subsequent models.   
The third hypothesis, which predicted that the role of moral values on voter 
behavior would be moderated by party affiliation, was also upheld. The test of structural 
invariance revealed differences in the magnitude of two structural paths in the model. 
First, a significant negative effect was found for the path from BF to intuitive reaction for 
Republicans, β = -.34, p < .001, whereas a significant positive effect was found for 
Democrats, β = .14, p < .05, indicating that greater endorsement of BF influenced more 
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negative reactions to compromise for Republicans, but positive reactions for Democrats. 
Second, the strength of the effect from partisanship to BF was also found to differ as a 
function of group affiliation in that higher levels of conservatism for Democrats were 
found to have a significantly stronger positive effect on endorsement of BF, β = .48, p < 
.001 whereas the strength of the effect was lower for Republicans, β = .25, p < .01. 
 
 
Additional Findings 
 Further investigation of the direct effects in the model revealed additional 
findings of note. Specifically, partisanship was found to have direct negative effects on IF 
(Democrat: β = -.19, p < .05; Republican: β = -.19, p < .05) and direct positive effects on 
BF (Democrat: β = .48, p < .001; Republican: β = .25, p < .01) for both parties indicating 
that increased conservatism effected lower endorsement of IF and higher endorsement of 
BF. Significant direct effects of partisanship on Purity/Sanctity were also found for 
Democrats, β = .16, p < .05, and Republicans, β = .27, p < .01, such that increased levels 
of conservatism where found to effect greater endorsement of this specific foundation for 
both groups. Similarly, modifications to the model indicated a direct positive effect from 
Harm/Care to Purity/Sanctity for both parties (Democrat: β = .14, p < .001; Republican: β 
= .22, p < .001).  
Although significant direct effects were found from BF to intuitive reaction, as 
noted above, the direct path from IF to intuitive reaction was not found to be significant 
for either party (Democrat: β = -.10, p > .05; Republican: β = .17, p = .058). Regarding 
the specified psychological factors, positive intuitive emotional reactions were found to 
effect more selfless attributions for compromise for both groups (Democrat: β = .33, p < 
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.001; Republican: β = .51, p < .001), and to have a positive direct effect on voting 
affirmatively for one’s congressperson (Democrat: β = .66, p < .001; Republican: β = .66, 
p < .001). Finally, attributions for a congressperson’s vote to compromise were found to 
have a positive direct effect on voter choice in that attributing a congressperson’s vote to 
his/her interest in the good of the country increased the likelihood that one would vote to 
keep that congressperson in office (Democrat: β = .28, p < .001; Republican: β = .30, p < 
.001)  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION 
This research highlights the central role that moral value foundations and 
psychological factors play in influencing voters’ political decisions. Specifically, this 
study indicates that one’s moral values, and related psychological factors, influence 
voting behavior related to fiscal issues above and beyond partisanship or ideology alone, 
which echoes previous research on culture war issues (Koleva et al., 2012).  Overall, 
these findings may even demonstrate how voters’ psychological reactions, drawn from 
their moral values, serve to punish politicians who violate their moral vision by 
ultimately voting them out of office.  
The hypothesized causal model representing both direct and indirect effects of 
moral values on voting behavior demonstrated good fit for Democrats, but poor fit for 
Republicans. After modifications to the model based on theoretical and statistical 
considerations, the fit improved for both, indicating that the influence of moral values on 
voting behavior was mediated by emotional and cognitive reactions to political 
compromise. This finding, that moral values exert their power by influencing one’s 
intuitive emotional reactions, and subsequent rationalizations, corroborates the theoretical 
predictions from MFT (Haidt, 2012). Findings are similarly consistent with cultural 
research findings guided by Betancourt’s integrative model demonstrating that the effect 
of cultural beliefs and values on behaviors is, at least in part, mediated by psychological 
processes. This highlights the need to study the role of socially shared cultural factors 
within the context of psychological processes and dispositions (see Betancourt et al., 
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2011; Flynn, Betancourt, Garberoglio, Regts, Kinworthy, & Northington, 2015; Flynn, 
Betancourt, & Ormseth, 2011). 
Similarly, the strength and direction of the specific paths were consistent with 
predictions based on MFT. For example, results confirmed previous findings that 
suggested that liberalism was associated with greater endorsement of IF whereas 
conservatism was associated with lower endorsement of IF. However, these findings 
present added complexity by suggesting that the noted effects of partisanship occur 
similarly within the more liberal Democratic and the more conservative Republican 
groups. Results also demonstrated that conservatism was associated with higher levels of 
endorsement of BF, although the strength of this effect was actually higher for 
Democrats. Findings like these highlight the reality of in-group heterogeneity that has 
been an undeniable tenet in cultural psychology (Betancourt & Flynn, 2009; Betancourt 
et al., 2011; Betancourt et al., 2010), but has been more elusive in political science. As 
such, the findings suggest that BF may also play a significant role for self-ascribed 
Democrats who may also rely on more traditionally conservative moral values.  
Moreover, the results underscore the importance of utilizing statistical techniques 
that can take into account this in-group variability by investigating moral values within a 
multivariate context. Although this research found many similar effects for both parties, 
by utilizing multivariate statistical techniques with multi-group comparisons, we were 
able to observe a greater complexity in effects based on party affiliation that would not be 
observed with bivariate comparisons alone. Specifically, between-group differences in 
direction and strength of effects were found, demonstrating that the effects of moral value 
foundations not only vary based on partisanship, but also vary within political party. It 
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was also found that levels of endorsement of these moral foundations actually have 
differential effects on how participants evaluate the political actions made by their 
politicians. Extant research has demonstrated notable variability in endorsement of moral 
values within different ideological categories of conservatism (Weber & Federico, 2013). 
As such, statistical analyses, like those utilized in the study, can help to shed light on the 
causal functionality of moral values across the spectrum of conservatism and liberalism, 
rather than more confined between-group mean comparisons.  
By utilizing these statistical techniques, this study yielded additional findings 
beyond those specifically highlighted by the research hypotheses. In particular, statistical 
tests for adding parameters suggested inclusion of a direct path from the Harm/Care 
foundation to the Purity/Sanctity foundation. Adding this path improved fit for both 
Republicans and Democrats and indicated a direct positive effect for both groups 
highlighting a potential unique relationship across value foundations such that increased 
endorsement of Harm/Care values effected increased endorsement of Purity/Sanctity 
values. Findings like these suggest that the varying influence of IF versus BF values may 
not be as dichotomous as previously noted. 
This study also highlights the fact that, even with lower aggregate endorsement of 
certain values based on ideology, those values still influence voter reactions toward 
compromise. Recent research has shown that, regardless of political ideology, priming for 
more abstract versus concrete thinking increases valuation of IF and decreases valuation 
of BF (Napier & Luguri, 2013). These findings also suggest that BF may be more 
peripheral for both groups and that liberals and conservatives primarily rely on IF, which 
seems to contradict predictions that conservatives would primarily rely on BF. However, 
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the current study shows that, even if peripheral, there is likely to still be an effect of BF, 
even for the more liberally persuaded Democratic participants. Therefore, it may be the 
case that, in other contexts, BF can be activated above and beyond their baseline 
functioning. Moreover, IF were found to have equal effects for both parties, whereas the 
effects of BF were found to differ between parties, indicating that the BF may be more 
important in differentiating party-based evaluations of politicians.  
Results also imply that the Purity/Sanctity foundation in particular may play a 
unique role in differentiating influential BF between parties. Although the statistical tests 
on lifting between-group constraints in testing measurement equivalence did not indicate 
doing so for the Purity/Sanctity foundation, there was some statistical indication of 
possible between-group measurement variance, which would suggest that the purity 
foundation was representative of BF for Democrats, but may play a more unique role for 
Republicans. The significant positive direct influence of partisanship on the purity 
foundation for both groups further highlights its distinct role in this context indicating 
that increased conservatism, regardless of party affiliation, uniquely influences increased 
endorsement of the purity foundation.  
This study also adds to a growing body of research that suggests that the strength 
of moral value foundations is affected by context. For example, when individuals’ 
cognitive resources are limited, they tend to endorse BF less (Wright & Baril, 2011), but 
endorse them more if they tend to perceive danger (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). The 
literature suggests that, given different political, or even social, considerations, we may 
see different effects of endorsement and effects of individual moral foundations. By 
analyzing the foundations separately, the complexity of effects may be further elucidated. 
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This would be consistent with research showing the differing relevancy of moral value 
foundations in various social contexts (Carnes, Lickel, & Janoff-Bulman, 2015). As such, 
multivariate analyses are additionally important in the study of moral values because the 
effects of moral foundations are likely to vary depending on the issue being studied.  
Although the current research suggests that moral values represent one potential 
mechanism underlying political gridlock, the question remains: what other factors are 
perpetuating and exacerbating gridlock? The results from this study, particularly in 
showing that Republicans demonstrated a more negative reaction to an act of political 
compromise, seem to suggest that Republicans are primarily responsible for perpetuating 
gridlock. However, there are several alternative explanations for these findings. First, the 
operationalization of political compromise may not have exclusively measured 
compromise. Although the vignette utilized a “balanced” economic bill that included both 
spending cuts and tax hikes, President Obama proposed a similarly balanced plan at times 
throughout his presidency. Therefore, the proposed bill may have actually been identified 
as a Democratic policy by participants in this study, rather than an effort at political 
compromise. If this was the case, Democratic participants likely reacted to a vote for this 
bill as upholding Democratic concerns, whereas Republican participants may have 
viewed the vote as a betrayal of their party’s concerns. In this way, the specific 
directionality of effects from BF to intuitive reaction may be suggestive of intolerance 
toward ideologically dissimilar and threatening groups (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, 
Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014), rather than actual reactions to political compromise. 
Public polling research indicates that, although both liberals and conservatives say they 
want compromise, partisans actually indicate that they want more of what their party asks 
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for (Pew Research Center, 2014). Similarly, the order of wording in the vignette 
presented the “increasing taxes on wealthy Americans,” first, which may have primed 
Republican participants’ to view the proposed bill as a betrayal of their concerns, while 
supporting Democratic concerns. Future research could investigate this by alternating the 
order of policy initiatives presented in the vignette.  
Second, both liberals and conservatives have been found to demonstrate 
intolerance towards groups with dissimilar ideology (Pew Research Center, 2014). In this 
case, the negative reactions identified for Republicans, and positive reactions for 
Democrats, may be indicative of a perceived moral boundary violation, and actually 
demonstrate the tendency for both liberals and conservatives to exclude individuals who 
violate their group’s moral parameters, and include individuals who do not. A more 
provocative question that follows for future researchers is related to why a balanced fiscal 
approach to the federal budget would be viewed as threatening for Republican 
participants. Perhaps the approach itself was not viewed as balanced, or if it was, perhaps 
refusal to compromise has itself become a value. One direction for future inquiry could 
be to investigate the current cultural/political media context. With more points of media 
contact now than at any point in history, the consistent activation of moral value 
foundations may be to blame for the apparent parting of the political red and blue seas. 
Continued efforts to understand and remedy this divide may be required before political 
divisiveness eliminates those navigating through the center.  
Third, it could be that Republican participants in this study, who skewed more 
economically advantaged, perceived the proposed bill in the vignette to be more 
personally threatening as it sought to increase their economic costs while decreasing 
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costs for those less economically advantaged. If so, the psychological reactions against 
threat, noted above, that lead to decreased tolerance of ideologically dissimilar groups, 
are also relevant. Similarly, research suggests that endorsement of BF predicted support 
for torture of out-group members (Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014). Rather than 
demonstrating differences in partisan reactions to compromise, results from the current 
study may actually highlight the tendency for voters who are more reliant on BF, 
Republican or Democrat, to punish politicians who violate their in-group moral values.  
Finally, there is some evidence from the literature that perceived government 
management may influence voter intentions. Winterish, Zhang, and Mittal (2012) found 
that high moral identity internalization influenced increased charitable giving to 
government-managed charities for liberals, and privately-managed charities for 
conservatives. Applied to the current research, the fact that the vignette implied 
government management may in and of itself led to more negative reactions by 
conservatives.  
Findings from this study have important implications for future research on moral 
value foundations in political contexts, as they help to broaden the scope of investigation 
to economic concerns. If moral value foundations do in fact influence our psychological 
reactions and subsequent behaviors to fiscal policy actions by politicians, then the 
messaging appeal of moral values goes beyond those social and environmental concerns 
previously highlighted.  Research has already shown that framing issues based on 
relevant moral foundation conditions can affect political attitudes for liberals and 
conservatives by either strengthening existing political attitudes, or altering political 
attitudes (e.g. increasing conservatives’ liberal attitudes)(Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 
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2014). Others have found evidence that existing examples of rhetoric by political elites 
utilize language that taps into moral foundations during public policy debates (Clifford & 
Jerit, 2013). The current study, taken with these results, suggests that moral rhetoric that 
appeals to relevant foundations could also be influential in fiscal policy debates.  
This research also extends a growing body of literature related to the utility of the 
robust conceptual framework employed to predict the structure of relationships. Although 
Betancourt’s integrative model for the study of culture, psychology, and behavior has 
previously been used to investigate the role of culture and psychological factors in health 
behavior, it demonstrated great utility in the present study on political behavior. Future 
research designed to investigate the influence of culture and psychology on political 
behavior may also benefit from utilizing this theoretical model.   
Despite the significance and implications of the study findings, some limitations 
should be considered. First, the sampling method used was chosen to maximize 
participation, but resulted in a sample over-representative of Anglo Americans and under-
representative of minorities. Additionally, this study was focused on investigating the 
influence of moral values for Republicans and Democrats. As such, these findings may 
be limited in generalizability to individuals affiliated with other political parties (e.g., 
Libertarian). Second, as noted in the results, the χ2 statistics in some of the structural 
equation models were significant, indicating unexplained variance, or correlations among 
measured variables. Although the other fit indices indicated excellent fit to the data, the 
significant χ2 statistics suggest that additional specifications may more fully explain the 
influence of moral values on political evaluations. For example, there was some evidence 
from the results (e.g., a significant direct path from partisanship to purity) that the purity 
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foundation may play a unique role in determining our political evaluations. Finally, as 
alluded to above, the measure of political compromise utilized in this study may have 
been more partisan than intended when it was initially constructed. Future researchers 
may seek to construct an improved measure of political compromise to remedy this 
limitation. 
Future research may also benefit from differentiating between types of emotions 
and the magnitude of their effects. This study utilized a single emotion variable to 
measure intuitional reactions that might have overlooked the complexity of emotional 
reactions, and may have not necessarily tapped into participants’ reactions as a member 
of a group. The structure of relationships investigated in this study was also based on the 
hypothesis from MFT that intuitive emotional reactions precede cognitive appraisals. 
Future research could test the order of the relationships between emotion and cognition 
by including expectations gleaned from attribution-emotion theory (Weiner, 2006), 
perhaps even investigating reciprocal emotion-cognition-emotion dynamics.  
Similarly, future research could investigate the causal effects of more complex 
psychological factors. For example, evidence for regional differences in personality 
profiles (Rentfrow, Gosling, Jokela, Stillwell, & Kosin, 2013) presents an exciting 
direction for research into how the causal influence of moral value foundations may 
actually vary by region within the United States, just as the current study demonstrated 
differences based on political party alone. Researchers could also expand investigation 
into the cognitive variables related to moral value foundations and political compromise 
by studying the influence of attributions of controllability. Some research has suggested 
that attributions about the president’s ability to control the national debt actually 
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predicted moral evaluations of the president (Chin & Cohen, 2014). Findings such as this 
highlight the important link between citizens’ moral schemas and the attributions they 
make for a politician’s behavior. Finally, the growing body of moral foundations and 
moral psychology research suggests both cross-cultural generalizability in endorsement 
of foundations (Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015), as well as important cross-cultural 
differences in the function of moral attributions (An & Trafimow, 2014). Future research 
should build on these findings and investigate the function of moral value foundations in 
political decision-making internationally, and among culturally diverse minority 
populations nationally, by utilizing robust theoretical frameworks that account for culture 
and psychology.  
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APPENDIX A 
MORAL FOUNDATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the 
following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this 
scale: 
[1] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right 
and wrong) 
[2] = not very relevant 
[3] = slightly relevant 
[4] = somewhat relevant 
[5] = very relevant 
[6] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and 
wrong)  
 
1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally  
2. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
3. Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
4. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority  
5. Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
6. Whether or not someone was good at math 
7. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
8. Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
9. Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
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10. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society  
11. Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
12. Whether or not someone was cruel 
13. Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
14. Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
15. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
16. Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of  
 
Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
 
1. Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
2. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring 
that everyone is treated fairly. 
3. I am proud of my country’s history. 
4. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
5. People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.  
6. It is better to do good than to do bad. 
7. One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. 
8. Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
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9. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done 
something wrong.   
10. Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
11. I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
12. It can never be right to kill a human being. 
13. I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor 
children inherit nothing. 
14. It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
15. If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would 
obey anyway because that is my duty. 
16.  Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
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APPENDIX B 
POLITICAL COMPROMISE SCALE 
In an attempt to get a Federal budget approved, imagine that a congressperson presented 
a bill that cuts deficits by raising taxes on higher income Americans AND cuts spending 
for social programs (such as welfare).  
 
1. Now imagine that a congressperson from your city/town and political party voted for 
this bill and it passed by one vote. How does this make you feel about your 
congressperson? 
 
[1] Very Displeased 
[2] Displeased  
[3] Somewhat Displeased 
[4] Neutral 
[5] Somewhat Pleased 
[6] Pleased 
[7] Very Pleased 
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2. On the following scale, please indicate whether you think your congressperson voted 
entirely out of interest for (0) personal gain, entirely out of interest for (5) the good of the 
country, or somewhere in between. 
 
[1] Entirely for personal gain 
[2] Mostly for personal gain 
[3] Partly for personal gain 
[4] Partly for the good of the country 
[5] Mostly for the good of the country 
[6] Entirely for the good of the country 
 
3. Based on this vote, how likely would you be to vote to keep this person in congress in 
the next election? 
 
[1] Very Unlikely 
[2] Unlikely 
[3] Somewhat Unlikely 
[4] Undecided 
[5] Somewhat Likely 
[6] Likely 
[7] Very Likely 
  
